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We present a model which allows us to show that even in a public
university system where tuition and fees are ﬁxed by the administration,
as t r a t i ﬁcation of public universities according to the quality they oﬀer
and the quality of students they select, can be observed. This result is
similar to that observed in private and competitive university systems. We
also show that it is very unlikely that segregation and stratiﬁcation could
be avoided by subsidizing those universities that are more ineﬃcient. We
show also that even if stratiﬁcation and segregation could be corrected
with subsidies it would be at the cost of ﬁxing the upper-bounds at the
quality that could be oﬀered at any university, hence ﬁxing quality limits
at the whole university system.
JEL (H42, I28)
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In the last years, public university systems in the EU have been widely criticized
(see The Economist, September 8th, 2005 and Neary et al 2003). There is some
concern on whether the current structure of public universities at the EU will
allow to close the gap on human capital endowments and on I+D+i outcomes
that can be observed between the EU economies and the US and Japanese
economies.
Critics argue that the main problem of the EU public university systems
is the lack of competition among universities. In general, universities do not
compete for students due to their lack of mobility. They neither compete for
public resources because the bulk of government transfers are decided on a per
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1student basis rather than on quality measures (scientiﬁc outcome, student’s
performance, etc.)1.
Another critic to the public university systems in the EU is that in most
countries public universities exist as autonomous institutions which are often
subject to rigid regulations at the national and regional level (see Mas-Colell
2003). Although there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences between countries and uni-
versities, there are some speciﬁc characteristics that public universities share,
in particular: i) universities are unable to aﬀect their revenues because they
cannot decide tuition and fees, ii) professors’ salaries are decided by the Gov-
ernment and universities cannot oﬀer economic incentives aimed at improving
the research productivity of their professors, and, iii) universities cannot select
their students (as private universities do) because traditionally the distribution
of students corresponds to the Government, etc.
Nevertheless, for the past few years some governments are favouring uni-
versity competition and are encouraging universities to reduce their ﬁnancial
dependency on government transfers. Universities are devoting greater eﬀorts
to ﬁnd additional ﬁnancial resources by engaging in income generating activities
and, therefore they are placing more emphasis on the eﬃcient use of universi-
ties’ resources. One of the results of those initiatives is that universities compete
among themselves for research projects, applied research contracts, and corpo-
rate consulting, both from the public and private sectors. Additionally, some
governments, like in the UK, have accepted that universities raise tuition and
fees signiﬁcantly, shifting the costs of higher education to students. This sug-
gests that price competition is also encouraged in the UK (see Department for
Education and Skills (2003)).
However, in some other EU countries (i.e. Spain, Germany, France, etc.)
governments —and also some academics- are still reluctant to foster price com-
petition among universities. Opponents to both price competition and a raise
in tuition and fees propose to continue with the current model, may be with
some minor changes, in which governments ﬁx low tuition and fees and devote
signiﬁcant amounts of resources to subsidize universities. Several arguments are
provided. First, in a framework with larger tuition and fees and lower subsidies
family income would play too large a role in the process by which students would
be distributed among universities. Second, stratiﬁcation of universities by their
quality and segregation of students by their income might occur under price
competition. They argue that low-income talented students might be excluded,
which does not satisfy the principle of equality of opportunities.
In fact, students sorting with stratiﬁcation by ability and income and univer-
sity stratiﬁcation have been shown empirically (Epple et al. 2003, Hoxby 1997)
as well as theoretically (Del Rey 2001, De Fraja and Iossa 2002 and Vanhaecht
and W. Pauwels 2005, etc.) in competitive university systems.
It is important to highlight that we are not arguing that stratiﬁcation is not
positive. We deal with the issue of stratiﬁcation because in many European
1In some countries, like Spain, universities depend on regional government transfers and in
some regions there is one public university only. Therefore, there is no competition for public
transfers in those regions.
2countries until recently, stratiﬁcation (elitism) has been considered as socially
unfair. On the contrary, in the US stratiﬁcation (diversiﬁcation) is considered as
an asset of their university system (see Bok 2003, Bowen, W.G. , M.A. Kurzweil,
and E. M. Tobin 2005).
In this paper we want to study whether a traditional public university ﬁ-
nancing scheme based on uniform and low tuition and fees succeeds in avoiding
stratiﬁcation of universities and segregation of students. We compare the re-
sults of such a policy with those derived from models of private competitive
universities which have been proven to cause stratiﬁcation and segregation.
Since there is a diversity of public university ﬁnancing schemes within the
EU we focus on the one that is implemented in Spain, which consists of: i)
governments ﬁx uniform and low tuition and fees, regardless of the cost of higher
education and the income of students’ families, ii) the government transfers
subsidies to some universities based on a per-student basis apparently aimed at
allowing universities to oﬀer the same quality of higher education.
Our results suggest that a publicly ﬁnanced university system based on low
and uniform tuition as well as on uniform subsidies to universities does not
prevent stratiﬁcation of universities. Furthermore, stratiﬁcation is not exclusive
of private competitive university systems. Our results also suggest that it is
very unlikely that segregation and stratiﬁcation could be avoided by subsidizing
the less eﬃcient universities. Additionally, we show that even in the case that
stratiﬁcation was avoided, it might be at the cost of ﬁxing an upper-bound to
the quality of education that could be supplied at all universities, including
those that are highly eﬃcient. This policy is not harmless because it excludes
the possibility that individuals who are willing to pay for higher quality can do
so.
At this point it is important to point out the distinction between "ﬁnancing
institutions of higher education" and "ﬁnancing students’ attendance to univer-
sities". In this paper we focus our analysis on higher education funding schemes
from the university’s perspective rather than from the student’s point of view.
There are many instruments that can be implemented by the government (loans,
grants, fellowships, vouchers, tax credits, etc.) other than charging low tuition
and fees to make it possible for all talented low-income students to attend the
university. As a matter of fact, opponents to low and uniform tuition and fees
argue that they represent implicit subsidies to rich students. Nevertheless, it is
important that reforms on university public funding as well as reforms on higher
education funding addressed to students might be designed and implemented
simultaneously.
This distinction is made also in the literature. On the one hand, Del Rey
and Racionero (2006), Kemnitz (2004), Epple et al (2003), Cigno and Lu-
porini (2003), Garcia-Peñalosa and Walde (2000) and Rose and Sorensen (1992),
among others, analyze the eﬀects of diﬀerent higher university funding schemes
from the students’ perspective. They analyze the eﬀects of pure loans, income
contingent loans, grants, subsidies, etc. on students’ performance and students’
welfare. However, they neither analyze stratiﬁcation eﬀects nor the eﬀects on
quality of education.
3On the other hand, Fethke (2005), Del Rey and Romero (2004), Ehremberg
and Rizzo (2004), Koshal and Koshal (2000), Golding and Katz (1998), Greene
(1994) and Ehrember and Sherman (1984) among other, analyze price determi-
nation in the higher education sector. A diﬀerent approach is found in Beath
et al (2005) where they approach the ways higher education funding schemes
inﬂuence the trade-oﬀ between research and teaching. They prove that under
some higher education funding schemes, which diﬀer on the weight given to
teaching and research, the university system may derive into a model where
some universities concentrate on teaching and do minimal research, while the
remainder do high quality research. However, this literature does not deal with
competition for students and faculty, as we do here.
We present a model of partial competition (since universities are subject to
some rigidity) among public universities. Although we assume that universities
do not compete in prices, because there is a public agency that ﬁxes tuition,
they compete among themselves for faculty and for the most talented students.
Further, this competition is not even since there are structural diﬀerences across
universities (student’s facilities, infrastructures, diﬀerences in teaching methods,
management procedures, etc.). Additionally, we assume that the public agency
is subject to a budget constraint that ﬁxes a limit on its capacity to subsidize
ineﬃcient universities.
In section two we present the model, while in section three we deal with
the results concerning university stratiﬁcation and students’ segregation. We
present conclusions in section four.
2 The model
As far as the model is concerned, there are three important features that should
be clariﬁed.
First, we have to refer to the process according to which student are assigned
to universities. We use a version of the procedure implemented in Spain in which
public universities cannot select their students. Instead, students are allocated
across universities by the administration, which takes into account: i) student’s
preferences (they rank universities in order of their preference), ii) the talent
of students (based on test scores at secondary school), and iii) the number of
students that can be admitted at each university This system may reduce
matching problems and strategic behavior2 of students and universities.
Second, we refer to the public funding scheme. University’s resources come
from two diﬀerent sources. On the one hand, from the tuition and fees charged
by universities to students, which are decided by the Government. On the
other hand, some universities might receive subsidies from the government. The
subsidy would consist of a per-student transfer and we assume that it is aimed at
allowing universities to oﬀer the same quality of higher education, which implies
avoiding stratiﬁcation.
2See Gale and Shapley (1962), and Roth and Oliveira (1990) for a survey on matching
issues in a university framework.
4Finally, we should remark that in this set up students are inputs themselves.
This means that if universities want to maximize quality, for given tuition and
fees, they should be able to select the best students. In other words, universities
should know student’s decision process be f o r et h e yh i r ep r o f e s s o r s .T h et i m i n g
of the model is as follows. First, we will ﬁnd the decision by students, then we
will analyze the universities’ decision concerning the professors they are going
to hire. This decision is taken considering the decision by the students and
by the other universities. Therefore, universities will hire professors aimed at
receiving the maximum number of applications so that the government will as-
sign them the most talented students. Finally, we will analyze the government’s
decision concerning tuition and fees that are going to be charged to students by
universities.
2.1 Professors
In our framework professors oﬀer their talent, denoted by µjk,( k refers to
university) inelastically, regardless of the wage or the incentives that they may
obtain. This talent is considered as exogenous and can be observed by university
managers. In our set up talent refers both to research and teaching abilities.
Professors obtain their income from two diﬀerent sources. First they receive
a ﬁxed wage (w) that is the same for all professors regardless of their talent
and it is decided by the government. Second, they receive an additional income
which is associated to the average talent of the other professors (w(
−
µk)), which
is decided by each university. Total income follows
Ijk = w[1 + w(
−
µk)k]. (1)
Professors will prefer to be hired by those universities that oﬀer the highest
incentives to their talent, thus a professor j will prefer to be hired by university






Professors have diﬀerent talents and the distribution of this talent among
them is assumed to be uniform. That is, µj ∈ [µmax,µ min],w i t hµmin > 0.
Nevertheless, this assumption is not crucial to our results.
2.2 Students.
The goal of the student is to choose the university that oﬀers a combination of
tuition and quality, which is observable that allows her to obtain the highest
level of net income. Therefore, they will rank ﬁrst the university that oﬀers
them the highest quality at a lower price.
Net income of a student i that attends university k follows:
INik =  [1 + φiHε
k] − Tk. (2)
5Tk is the cost of attending university k. Income consists of a minimum wage
( ) that increases according to the talent of the student (φi) and the quality of
the education received at the university she will attend (Hk). We assume that
ε<1. Students will attend any of the universities if  φiHε
k >T k ∀k =1 ...K.
Students have diﬀerent talents and the distribution of this talent among
students is assumed to be uniform. That is, φi ∈ [φmax,φ min],w i t hφmin > 0.
Nevertheless, this assumption is not crucial to our results.
In this paper we do not consider students’ budget constraints of any kind.
We assume that students can aﬀord attending any of the universities. We as-
sume that they may receive transfers from their parents, they may have access
to loans, or they may receive grants and fellowships from the Administration.
This assumption is aimed at avoiding dealing with students sorting by income.
Additionally, we assume that there are no mobility costs, which allows us to
work beyond the traditional framework of spatial competition.
Once students know the combination of tuition and qualities at each uni-
versity they will rank universities in order of their preference based on the net
income levels they would obtain. The student will choose university k as the
ﬁrst in her ranking if INk >IN l,f o r∀k 6= l, l =1 ,2...K where K is the number
of universities. This means that she will rank university k ﬁrst as far as
 φ i Hε
k − Tk >  φ i Hε
l − Tl ∀k 6= l,l =1 ,2...K.
In case that tuition and fees were the same, she will prefer the university
that oﬀers the highest quality.
In order to ﬁnd the student’s choice, we will use the indiﬀerence curve of
the student concerning tuition and the quality of education. All combinations
of tuition and qualities that allow her to obtain the same level of net income
follow:




As we see in Figure (1), for a given tuition, the higher the quality of education
students receive the higher the net income they will obtain. This explains why
students might be willing to pay higher tuition in order to have access to better
education. They prefer point K to J because they will obtain a higher net
income even if they pay higher tuition at K. Finally, we observe that the larger
the talent of a student, the more she will be willing to pay for the same quality
of education.
2.3 University Managers
Public universities can hire professors and decide on the incentives they can
oﬀer them based on their talent. Nevertheless, they are subject to some rigidity
because they cannot change the number of professors and students.
6We assume that the goal of the university managers is to maximize excel-
lence, following Epple and Romano (2003). We measure excellence according to
the quality of education oﬀered at each university. Higher education quality (H)
depends on three factors. First, it depends on the average ability of professors
in that university (
−
µk). Second, it depends on the average talent of the student
body (
−
φk), and third, it depends on a set of factors that are exogenously given:
infrastructures, libraries, students’ facilities, physical surroundings, etc. that










w h e r ew ea s s u m et h a tα + β =1 .
There are two costs to be considered by university managers: i) wage costs,
and ii) costs that correspond to college inputs that are sensitive to student ap-
titude. As far as wage costs are concerned, universities pay a ﬁxed salary (w)
which is the same for all universities and it is decided by the government. Ad-
ditionally, each university can oﬀer incentives to their professors which depend














with ηk > 0.
As far as the costs that are sensitive to students’ talent (c(
−
φk,))a r ec o n -
cerned, we argue that there are some services that are necessary in order to
provide high quality education to talented students: well endowed libraries, ad-
vanced teaching and learning methods, job market services, academic support
to students, access to technology, etc. We assume that the higher the average





w h e r ew ea s s u m et h a tρk is exogenous and diﬀerent across universities. One
might interpret that ρk captures the degree of eﬃciency of university k.
University’s revenues depend on the tuition and fees (T) that they can charge
to the (M) students. In addition to that universities might occasionally receive
subsidies from the government. We take for granted that these transfers, de-
noted by (ts), are related to the number of students. To make things easier, we
take that the number of students is the same at all universities.
We assume that universities are subject to a budget constraint





where Nk denotes the number of professors. We assume that M>N k.
7Altogether, the problem for the university is to maximize the quality of































The role of the government is to guarantee that students have access to the same
quality of higher education regardless of the university they will be assigned.
This implies that the government wants to avoid stratiﬁcation of universities.
The instrument implemented to achieve this goal is a per-student subsidy
(tsk) that will be transferred to the university that oﬀers low quality higher
education. The government is subject to a budget constraint as follows:
G = tskM,
where G is the amount of resources that the government has decided to devote
to subsidize universities (G)3 and M is the number of students at the university
that will receive the subsidies.
Finally, the government decides the tuition and fees that universities can
charge to students.
3R e s u l t s
This section has two parts. In the ﬁrst part we obtain the quality supply curve of
the university. Universities choose the inputs considering the per-student income
-tuition and fees- as given and behave competitively. We provide this supply
curve for descriptive purposes only because the equilibrium analysis should take
into account that universities do not select their students. If universities want
to maximize quality they should attract the best students because students are
inputs themselves. This means that universities should know student’s decision
process before they hire professors.
In the second part of this section we analyze the results concerning strat-
iﬁcation of universities and segregation of students when universities compete
3In this paper we do not analyze how this amount of resources is decided. Very often
it does not depend on the necessities of the university system but on political preferences,
availability of resources, etc. In this paper the task of the government is to manage the
amount of resources that have been assigned for that purpose.
8among themselves for students and faculty. The timing of the model is as fol-
lows. First, we will ﬁnd the decision by students, then we will analyze the
universities’ decision concerning the professors they are going to hire. This de-
cision largely depends on the decisions made by the students, and by the other
universities. Therefore, universities will hire professors aimed at receiving the
maximum number of applications in order to be assigned the most talented stu-
dents by the government. Finally, we will analyze the government’s decision on
T, subject to a budget constraint.
3.1 Quality of education supply
In a standard set up the university would choose the level of inputs consider-
ing their costs (w,ρk and ηk )a sw e l la st h ep e r - s t u d e n ti n c o m e( T + ts)a s
exogenous.









Equation (6) together with the budget constraint in (5) yields the average








which denotes that the larger the university’s income the better the talent of
the professors that the university would be willing to hire.
Finally, the university would decide the quality of higher education that it
would oﬀer, which depends on the per-student income received. That is, the
quality that university k could oﬀer depending on the income (T + ts)t h a ti t
will receive and on the professors’ costs follows:
















As we can observe in equation (8), the larger the professors’ (w,Nk,ηk)a n d
students’ costs (ρk) the larger the tuition that the university should receive in
order to ﬁnance a given level of quality. However, both the number of students
and the endowment of the university (infrastructures, management methods,
etc.) would allow the university to supply that quality at lower tuition.
Although the supply curves can take many shapes, if there were only two
universities we can represent them in the following ﬁgures (3) and (4)4.
Figures3,4
4Alternatively, both supply curves could be parallel.
9If universities charged the same tuition and fees (T) and if they received the
same per-student subsidy (ts) from the government (tx = T + ts), the quality
of education that could be oﬀered by university k would follow:
H∗










In ﬁgure (5) we see that the per-student income received by universities
(tx) determines the maximum and the minimum level of quality that can be




max). Thus, we see that
Hs
k(tx) >H s
l (tx). We should also point out that the larger the tuition charged,
the higher the quality both universities can oﬀer
Figure5
It is important to remark that in this set up if universities received uniform
per-student income they would not be able to oﬀe rt h es a m eq u a l i t yo fe d u c a -
tion. Thus, if the government wanted universities to be able to oﬀer the same
quality it should devote additional resources to the less eﬃcient universities.
Alternatively, it could decide that universities charged diﬀerent tuition and fees
to their students.
However, in order to analyze the ﬁnal distribution of students across univer-
sities and the quality of education that will be oﬀered at any of the universities
we must take into consideration that this is not a standard problem in which
the ﬁrm can select both inputs. In our framework universities do not select
students directly. Students apply to universities and they are assigned by the
government to one university or another depending on their preferences, on their
talent and on the number of students that can be registered at each given uni-
versity. This means that if universities wanted to be ranked ﬁrst in student’s
preferences they should supply the highest quality at the lowest price. That is,
student’s behavior determines university’s decisions. This is crucial issue as far
as the professors hired by the university is concerned because their quality will
ﬁnally determine student’s decision.
In the following section we will analyze the decision made by students and
universities assuming that the government ﬁxes uniform tuition and fees5 and
that no subsidies are implemented. We will then analyze government’s decision
allowing for subsidies.
3.2 University competition under uniform tuition and no
subsidies.
In this section we analyze the results obtained in the case that there were no
subsidies to universities and in case that the government might ﬁx the tuition
that universities are allowed to charge to their students. We work within a
framework where the government decides that all students pay the same tuition
5This policy is rather common in Spanish public universities.
10and fees regardless of the universities they attend6. We focus our analysis on
t h ec a s eo ft w ou n i v e r s i t i e sa n dw ea s s u m et h a tAl <A k.
We will show that in spite of public intervention, stratiﬁcation of universities
and sorting of students by their talent can occur. These results are consistent
with those found in models of competition among private universities.
In order to analyze which university will oﬀer the highest quality we must
consider the students’ decision ﬁrst.
Students’ decision.
Since tuition and fees are the same across universities, students will rank
them based on the quality they oﬀer (they know Aj, Nj,
−
µj ∀j = k,l).
Due to peer-eﬀects students might be interested in attending the university
that selected the best students. If the most M talented students joined in one
university their average talent would be
−
φmax. Any other distribution would
yield an average distribution of talent
−




φ.T h e M most















j Aj ∀j = k,l. (10)
The other students will also prefer to be admitted in the university where
the most talented students chose to register. Therefore, peer-eﬀects motivate
that students rank ﬁrst the university where the best students gather.
However, which university would those students rank ﬁrst? They would rank





























Therefore, if condition (12) was satisﬁed, university k would be selected by
these (M) students at the top in their rank of preferences. This rank would be
the same for all students, regardless of their talent.
Once the government knew the rank of universities and the student’s abilities





We must stress that once students were assigned to any university by the
Government, they could do nothing in order to change this allocation. They
cannot change their talent and they cannot pay higher fees and tuition in order
to be accepted.
6This analysis would also be valid if we considered that there were uniform fees and tu-
ition and that the government transferred uniform per-student subsidies to any of the given
universities.











then apparently, students should show no preference for any of the two univer-
sities given. However, they would still prefer the university where most talented
students were accepted.
Universities’ decision.
If university k wanted to be ranked ﬁrst and be assigned the best M students,
it should hire professors with an average talent that satisﬁed condition (12).
This depends on the quality of the professors selected by university l and the
structural diﬀerences between universities (Ak, Al). It is interesting to note
that university k could be selected ﬁrst event if it hired professors that were
less talented than those hired by university l. This would be possible if Ak were
high enough.
What kind or professors would be hired by each of the two universities?
We should take into account that the basic salary is ﬁxed and decided by the
government though universities can oﬀer additional income to its professors
depending on their talent. Therefore, the decision by the professor depends on
the incentives she can receive at each university. These incentives are associated
to the average talent of her fellows.
However, incentives are subject to the budget constraint of each university.
Any of the universities that wanted to be ranked ﬁrst by the M most talented
students could aﬀord the following incentives:
−











µkwηk are the incentives that each professor could receive
were they hired by university l and k respectively. If universities k and l could
hire the best Nk and Nl professors, they could be able to pay them ηk , ηl,
respectively.




















and µl(Nl) represent the average quality of the most Nk and Nl talented
professors were they hired by university k or l, respectively. As a consequence if
12condition (16) was satisﬁed, all professors would prefer to be hired by university





If the previous inequality (17) holds, so does condition (12). Thus, university
k m i g h tb ea b l et oo ﬀer the highest quality at the same tuition and fees.
This result shows that even in the case that the Administration ﬁxed uni-
form tuition and fees (or alternatively that universities received the same per-
student income), stratiﬁcation of universities by their quality as well as segre-
gation of students by their talent could be observed. It is important to remark
that this result is very close to that obtained in models that analyze competi-
tion among private universities both from empirical and theoretical approaches
(Hoxby (1997) and Epple and Romano (2003)).
Up to this point we have not mentioned how the administration decided the
tuition that universities could charge. This decision depends on many factors:
the number of universities, the resources available to ﬁnance higher education,
the desired number of students enrolled, etc.
In this paper, since the number of students is ﬁxed and that they do not
face budget constraints, we assume that the goal of the administration is to
guarantee that students receive the same quality of higher education regardless
of the university the attend. This means that the aim of this policy is to avoid
stratiﬁcation between universities. We are not claiming that stratiﬁcation (or
diversiﬁcation) is a negative outcome. We just try to represent a model that is
being currently implemented in Spain and other EU members which apparently
try to avoid the growth of quality diﬀerences in the education oﬀered by public
universities.
3.2.1 University competition under uniform tuition and public sub-
sidies.
As shown in ﬁgure (6) when the government decides the tuition (T)t h a tw i l lb e
charged by all universities, it also determines the quality of education supplied
by the best university, university k.I fu n i v e r s i t yl received this tuition (T), it
would not be able to supply the same quality of education. If this university l
was to compete with k, segregation and stratiﬁcation would occur.
Figure 6
A p p a r e n t l y ,i no r d e rt oa v o i ds t r a t i ﬁcation to occur, the government might
oﬀer a per-student subsidy tsl to university l. If this were the case per-student
income for university l would be (T+tsl). This income should be large enough in
order to allow university l to supply the same quality that is oﬀered at university
k:
Hl(tsl + T)=Hk(T). (18)
13In this section we analyze whether this policy would allow the government to
prevent stratiﬁcation and segregation in a framework where universities compete
to attract students and professors. Results of this policy depend on the amount
of resources that the government chooses to devote to subsidize universities
(G), as well as on the number of students at the university that will receive the
subsidies (M)
G = tslM.
In order to decide on T and tsl, the government should know students’
and universities’ decision ﬁrst. Some questions arise if the government policy
is aimed at guaranteeing that all universities oﬀered the same quality: i) how
would students rank universities?, would they care whether to attend university
k or l?, ii) how would universities decide the talent of their professors? or, iii)
how would the government choose T and ts?
If there were uniform tuition and fees and if students knew ex-ante that they
would have access to the same quality of education regardless of the university
they might attend, their ranking of universities would be undetermined. The
fact that talented students gather or not in one given university would not
matter because the government guarantees the same quality.
At this stage we should remark that we assume that the government cannot
allocate students and professors as a social planner so as to guarantee that
condition (18) is satisﬁed. It is obvious that, in case they could, there would be
no need for subsidies. We assumed that students choose the university and the
government allocates students according to their preferences and grades.
Let us assume that students ranking and government allocation of students
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which means that the government should subsidize university l until it is able


















The main problem faced by the government is how it is going to decide on
tsl such that universities hire professors with an average talent that satisﬁes





l Al, in order for students to be indiﬀerent between universities k
and l, university l should be able to hire professors that were more talented




µk. However, we should
highlight that diﬀerences between average talent of professors should not be
14larger than those that appear on the right hand side of equation (20). It may
occur otherwise that ex-post Hl >H k. If this were the case the university k
m i g h th a v et ob es u b s i d i z e di n s t e a d .
The question that arises is how can the government guarantee a distribution
of professors that satisﬁed condition (19) in a framework where professors apply
to universities according to the income they are going to receive?
Two alternative policies could be implemented.
A) First, the government may decide to subsidize university l such that it
was able to oﬀer the same incentives to their professors as those that might be















In this case, professors would be indiﬀerent as whether to work at universities
k or l because income in both universities would be the same. In this case none
of the universities could oﬀer additional income to attract the most talented
professors.
The problem is that in this set up the government cannot guarantee that the
ﬁnal distribution of professors satisﬁes condition (20). If this distribution would
not satisfy condition (20) what could the government do in order to correct this
situation?
B) Second, the government could decide that university l received additional
income so that they could hire professors who are better talented than those
hired by the other university. The government might implement a per-student















In this case, university l would be able to pay larger incentives to its pro-
fessors and all of them would be interested in being hired by that university,
regardless of their talent. Thus, university l would be able to select those pro-




µk. Nevertheless, in this
set up the government cannot guarantee that the ﬁnal distribution of profes-
sors across universities exactly satisﬁes condition (20). If this condition is not




µk were too large, then the gov-
ernment might have to subsidize university k instead. Therefore, even when
the possibility that a distribution of talent of professors such that condition
(20) is satisﬁed exists, the government cannot guarantee that this distribution
is achieved in a framework where students and professors can choose any of the
given universities. It is therefore very unlikely that the government could avoid
stratiﬁcation and segregation through per-student transfers to the less eﬃcient
universities.
15The government, though, has an additional problem to face. Even in the
case that the government could avoid stratiﬁcation by implementing policies
A) and B), the government should decide the level of tuition and fees that
students should pay (T). This decision depends on the existing diﬀerences
between universities (represented in Aj,
−
φj,N j,ρ j,ηj ,∀j = k,l)a sw e l la so n
the amount of resources devoted to subsidize universities (G).
Let us assume that stratiﬁcation was avoided by implementing a subsidy to















Given that tsl = G
M and using expression (23) the government would ﬁnd












where we see that T∗, which determines the quality of education that would be
oﬀered by both universities, depends on the amount of resources (G)d e v o t e d
to reduce diﬀerences between universities.
To sum up, in this section we tried to show that it is very unlikely that the
policy of subsidizing some universities might prevent from stratiﬁcation. There
are still two remarks to make, though. First, we cannot say anything about the
distribution of students across universities because they would not care whether
to attend one particular university or the other. Segregation is still a plausible
result. Second, non-stratiﬁcation would be accomplished at the cost of ﬁxing an
upper-bound to the level of quality that even the best universities could oﬀer.
If the government were not subject to a budget constraint any level of quality
could be ﬁnanced and any result obtained in the private sector could also be
replicated. However, due to the budget constraint and the limits on tuition and
fees that universities can charge there is a restriction on the quality of education
that can be provided even at the best public universities. More important, this
policy restricts the decision of those talented students who would be willing to
pay higher fees and tuition in order to have access to higher quality of education.
4C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper we tried to show that stratiﬁcation of public universities and
segregation of students by talent can also occur in a public university system.
Uniform tuition and fees at public universities does not prevent stratiﬁcation
and segregation.
In order to avoid stratiﬁcation public administrations might decide to im-
plement a subsidy aimed at guaranteeing that all universities oﬀer the same
16quality of higher education. However, this policy does not prevent the segre-
gation of students, who would be indiﬀerent between attending one university
o rt h eo t h e r .I na d d i t i o nt ot h a tw es h o w e dt h a ti ti sv e r yu n l i k e l yt h a ts t r a t -
iﬁcation could be prevented by subsidizing ineﬃcient universities because the
government cannot decide either the allocation of professors or that of students
across universities. We also showed that even if stratiﬁcation could be pre-
vented through subsidies, this achievement would be at the cost of ﬁxing an
upper-bound at the quality that could be oﬀered at the best universities, hence
ﬁxing quality limits at the whole university system. Worst, it would restrict the
decision of those talented students who would be willing to pay higher tuition
and fees in order to have access to higher quality of education.
Although it is true that segregation by income may occur if we consid-
ered students’ income diﬀerences, it is important that we distinguish between
ﬁnancing higher education institutions and ﬁnancing students’ attendance to
universities. There are many instruments that can be implemented by the ad-
ministration (loans, grants, fellowships, vouchers, tax credits, etc.) aimed at
guaranteeing that all talented low-income students might have access to the
university. This implies that in order to guarantee access of low-income tal-
ented students to higher education, should make use of diﬀerent alternatives
than ﬁxing low and uniform tuition. As a matter of fact, this policy represents
implicit subsidies to rich and poorly talented students and limits the quality of
higher education due to the government’s budget constraint.
A natural extension of the model would consist in allowing diﬀerent jurisdic-
tions, therefore introducing competition among regional governments because
they decide on the tuition and the subsidies to the universities in their jurisdic-
tions. Stratiﬁcation may also occur in favour of those universities that received
higher subsidies and ﬁxed lower tuition because their administration provided
more resources. Strategic competition among governments has been partially
analyzed in Fethke (2005). However, he does not analyze issues on segmentation
or stratiﬁcation.
Another extension of the model is for universities to change the selection
process of students. If we allowed universities to select their students, results
might change. The diﬃculty, from a theoretical point of view, is to deﬁne the
algorithm according to which stable matching would occur.
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